



# Winston Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War 1951–1955

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Everyone interested in colonial America and Native Americans will want to read the excellent introduction, which provides an up-to-date overview of the state of research and interpretations of the historic contact period. Grumet cogently assesses published material, the archaeological record (including issues of dating, interpretation of artifacts, and controversies over Indian burials), and a great mound of architectural, ethnographic, and ethnohistorical surveys. Students beginning projects on Indians in the colonial northeast will find this book more accessible than the *Handbook*, but both are indispensable reference tools. Every college and university library should own this book.

JAMES HOMER WILLIAMS  
Middle Tennessee State University

Cave, Alfred A.  
**The Pequot War**  
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press  
232 pp., \$45.00 cloth, \$14.95 paper  
ISBN 1-55849-029-9 cloth  
ISBN 1-55849-030-2 paper  
Publication Date: June 1996

Alfred A. Cave, a professor of history at the University of Toledo, has provided an innovative examination of the causes and the actual course of the Pequot War. What makes this work unique is the powerful combination of analytical and presentational perspectives. Cave effectively weaves ideological, ethnohistorical, and economic analyses into a narrative format.

Individual chapters focus on perceptions the Puritans and Pequots had of each other, economic relationships among and between Europeans and Native Americans, the immediate causes of the war, the actual conflict, and the short-term and long-term significance of this tragic encounter. At appropriate points, Cave interweaves discussion of the relevant historiography, both colonial and modern.

There are numerous strengths to this book. Cave avoids the temptation to focus disproportionately on the Puritan slaughter of the Pequots at Mystic Fort in 1637. Instead he wisely sticks to his stated goal of narrating how this tragedy came to be. His willingness to take perceptions and misperceptions seriously as causal factors influencing the actions of both Puritans and Pequots is illuminating, but he also examines the tangled diplomatic and economic contexts of Puritan-Dutch, Puritan-Pilgrim, Dutch-Pequot, Puritan-Pequot, and Pequot-Mohegan-Narragansett relationships in the Connecticut Valley in the years immediately preceding this conflict. This broad analytical framework supports the author's convincing explanation of a critical influence on the outbreak of actual hostilities: the toughening Puritan position on apprehending those responsible for the murder of John Stone. Cave argues that this escalation resulted from economic and diplomatic com-

petition, Pequot misunderstanding of the impact their admission of involvement in the Stone affair had on the Puritans, and Puritan ministers' calls for punishment of "savages." This multifaceted approach leads to a strong, evidence-based argument for Puritan culpability in initiating the war.

The generally convincing tone of this work is marred occasionally by the author's tendency to express disappointment that the Puritans never learned to view the Pequots through the lens of modern anthropological knowledge. From a production standpoint, this book would have benefited from a map showing the locations of major sites mentioned in the text. These criticisms aside, Cave has given historically minded general audiences an in-depth and convincing view of the Pequot War. In addition, he has provided scholars with the all too rare opportunity to interact with a work that blends traditional and innovative perspectives on the past.

STEPHEN C. MESSER  
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Taylor, William B.  
**Magistrates of the Sacred:  
Parish Priests and Indian Parishioners  
in Eighteenth-Century Mexico**  
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press  
868 pp., \$75.00, ISBN 0-8047-2456-3  
Publication Date: June 1996

This is an impressive book, even a daunting one. In it, William B. Taylor, a professor of history at Southern Methodist University, examines at length the relations between the parish clergy and their congregations in the Archdiocese of Mexico and the Diocese of Guadalajara from the mid-eighteenth century to the decade of the independence struggle. He shows how that relationship was altered, mostly to the disadvantage of the priests, by Bourbon absolutism, which sought to interpose the authority of the state between Catholic clergymen and Indian communicants. The imposition took many forms, including the establishment in 1767 of standard *aranceles*, or schedules of fees paid by parishioners for baptisms and other sacramental services performed by priests, who derived much of their income from such payments. As Taylor demonstrates, employing a rich sampling of case studies, the arancel reform alone, although it unquestionably relieved some Indian communities of arbitrary demands for fees by unscrupulous priests, also triggered an avalanche of fresh complaints to the civil authorities, district

judges, and regional law courts alike, regarding alleged clerical perfidy. Bourbon regalists were not unhappy to see the autonomy of the parish clergy reduced by means of this and other reforms, but they apparently failed to recognize that their assault on priestly authority would inevitably subvert the partnership between altar and throne on which the legitimacy of the colonial order as a whole was based, both in Indian Mexico and elsewhere. Also, as Taylor explains in a superb concluding chapter, the loyalties of some of the parish clergy were so undermined by intrusive royal policies that up to 10 percent of them actively supported the various insurgent movements of 1810-1821 to some degree, while many others tried to maintain a precarious neutrality for themselves and their parishioners, a stance that royalists equated, not unreasonably, with the denial of support for the crown's cause.

This work builds on Taylor's monograph on colonial rural Oaxaca and, even more, on his comparative regional study of social pathology and insurgency in central and southern Mexico, *Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages*. It also augments Nancy Farriss's examination of the impact of Bourbon regalism on the Catholic hierarchy, *Crown and Clergy in Colonial Mexico*, by emphasizing the rural priesthood, its training, outlook, and duties, as well as its involvement in controversies. In view of its encyclopedic coverage, based largely on the resources of public and ecclesiastical repositories in Mexico, Spain, and the United States, as well as over 250 pages of detailed notes, *Magistrates of the Sacred* is intended for a specialized audience. On the other hand, its jargon-free text reads easily and, at times, passionately: Taylor clearly cares about how his subjects coped with the unsettling consequences of Bourbon ecclesiastical policies.

DAVID B. ADAMS  
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Young, John  
**Winston Churchill's Last Campaign:  
Britain and the Cold War 1951-1955**  
New York: Oxford University Press  
358 pp., \$72.00, ISBN 0-19-820367-5  
Publication Date: April 1996

This is an important, scholarly study of Winston Churchill's last term in office as British prime minister. John Young, a professor of politics at the University of Leicester, England, has produced a masterly account of Churchill's often desperate attempts to

arrange a great power summit between 1951 and 1955 (the *Last Campaign* of the title). In the process, Young puts forward his thesis that the traditional view of Churchill as a hard-headed "Cold Warrior" is wrong. Instead, Young argues, Churchill spent his final premiership in search of a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union in order to reduce Cold War tensions. Churchill called this his policy of "easement," and it revolved around the idea of negotiation from strength.

To be sure, Churchill remained as implacably opposed to communism as ever; and it is certainly true that Churchill was as suspicious as other Western leaders of Soviet peace initiatives, particularly during the frantic period when the Soviet Union traded diplomatic notes with Western governments between February and October 1952. Nevertheless, Young makes a convincing case that Churchill's hankering for a return to the "spirit of Yalta" represented a genuine desire to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union and thereby reduce the risk of a nuclear conflagration.

Churchill was fully aware that there would be no progress here without U.S. support; Young is very good at describing the frustrations felt by Churchill when first President Truman and later President Eisenhower rebuffed his attempts to revive the wartime intimacy the prime minister had enjoyed with President Roosevelt. Churchill did manage to arrange informal, wide-ranging meetings with both Truman and Eisenhower; these demonstrations of Western unity, however, were not the springboards to a great power summit that Churchill had intended them to be.

One of the main obstacles in Churchill's path to a summit was Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Part of the beauty of Young's study is the light it sheds on the fascinating struggle between the aging Churchill and Eden, his presumptive heir, for control of British foreign policy. Like many officials at the Foreign Office and Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, Eden was convinced that another Yalta-like meeting would spell disaster for Britain and for the West; the foreign secretary worked assiduously to ensure that any great power meeting be confined to the level of foreign ministers, where the agenda would be strictly controlled, and where negotiations would be conducted on a case-by-case basis. Ironically, a great power summit was eventually held in Geneva in July 1955, shortly after Eden had replaced Churchill as prime minister.

Young's conclusions that Churchill's policy of "easement" stood firmly in the British tradition of diplomacy and that his vision of détente was a forerunner of both the European- and U.S.-inspired versions in the 1970s are bound to stir controversy. It will be interesting to watch the reactions to this new interpretation by historians who have marked Churchill as an unreconstructed Cold Warrior.

MICHAEL PAUL  
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Jones, Matthew  
**Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44**  
New York: St. Martin's Press  
293 pp., \$65.00, ISBN 0-312-12646-8  
Publication Date: March 1996

Those familiar with the uneasy, indeed distrustful, nature of Anglo-American relations during the 1930s will find more of the same elucidated here, this time in relation to the conduct of World War II in the Mediterranean. In contrast to the high command's public facade of harmonious cooperation, tensions were commonplace and troublesome. This study examines the major issues and disputes, both military and political, that arose in Anglo-American relations between the invasion of French North Africa in 1942 and British intervention in Greece in 1944. Sharp differences on specific issues often carried strong overtones of divergent long-term objectives and the gradual, but inexorable, displacement of Britain by the United States in the world-power structure.

Tension was inherent in the two nations' initial attitudes toward North Africa and the Mediterranean: Britain wished to concentrate Allied efforts there and attack the European continent from "beneath," while the United States leaned heavily toward a direct cross-channel attack and was more concerned than Britain about the war in the Pacific. In those circumstances, disputes about the command and control of military operations, reinforced by deeply ingrained national biases, prejudices, and stereotypes—and, of course, personality conflicts—were unavoidable. As the war progressed and administrative structures assembled for liberated territories, conflicts over civil affairs emerged with equal or greater intensity. Occupation strategy was a source of near-constant controversy: The British were inclined to pursue attritional objectives, and the Americans were reluctant to become embroiled in "sideshows" that they suspected contained unscrupulous political objectives. Sometimes, of course, Anglo-American differences were complicated by controversy within each camp: in the case of Britain, disagreements emerged among Churchill, the Foreign Office, the resident minister in Algiers (Harold Macmillan), and certain generals; in the case of America, the differences were among Roosevelt and his advisers, the state and military departments, and commanders in the field. The author, Matthew Jones, gives much credit to General Eisenhower, the Allied commander in the Mediterranean until late 1943, and Macmillan for their efforts to understand their ally's position and to promote harmony against difficult odds, including criticism by fellow nationals for being "too soft" on the other side. Churchill's reputation for letting emotion and imagination sometimes outrun practical considerations and Roosevelt's tendency to look too simplistically on certain more complicated issues are reinforced here, although their mutual commitment to the supreme objective of vic-

tory, which often required compromise, is beyond question. The latter may also be said of all the persons who are described in this work—which is oftentimes strong on the characterization of personalities—so that we are reminded once more of how objective circumstances override philosophical postures at critical junctures.

Jones concludes that most of the problems of cooperation in the Mediterranean revolved around the issue of "seniority." There was a marked reluctance (no doubt understandable) in Britain to recognize the United States' emergence, to accept the role of junior partner, and to realize that the postwar international order must rest on American power. Britain's experience in Greece in 1945-46 hastened that acceptance.

A lecturer in history at Royal Holloway, University of London, Jones has produced a well-researched, thoroughly documented study that does not extensively alter the already established picture of Anglo-American wartime relationships but describes in illuminating detail the course and nature of those relationships in one particular theater of the war. The book may be read with profit by any student of history, but a general account of Allied wartime relationships may be a beneficial beginning point for the uninitiated. The price will put the book out of reach for many general readers.

WILLIAM R. ROCK  
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Searle, G. R.  
**Country before Party: Coalition and the Idea of "National Government" in Modern Britain, 1885-1987**  
London and New York: Longman  
309 pp., \$62.92 cloth, \$27.92 paper  
ISBN 0-582-20952-8 cloth  
ISBN 0-582-20951-X paper  
Publication Date: February 1996

This is one of those rare scholarly books that has something to offer to a wide range of readers. Students new to the study of British politics over the past century will find G. R. Searle, a professor of history at the University of East Anglia, an admirably sure-footed guide through the changing features of Britain's political landscape. Specialists, however, will recognize that Searle is determined to explore such familiar terrain in a novel and illuminating manner by focusing on the recurrent concern for "national government."

Of course, Britain has long been regarded as the classic example of a stable two-party polity—one noted for its "fidelity to the Gladstone-Disraeli syndrome" (252). Coalitions or national governments, on the other hand, are customarily dismissed as nothing more than temporary expedients that are cobbled together only in extraordinary circumstances and discarded once the crisis has passed in favor of "normal" partisan conflict. Yet, as with other comforting aspects of the nation's